Abstract-Facing with the private information asymmetry, transaction is successfully delivered and will benefit the bilateral parties who can get maximized utility, but the automatic implementation of trading need to satisfy the corresponding conditions. Model built by strategic game method is applied to depict the trading game process under given the linear strategy space of both parties, finally some useful conclusions are introduced.
I. INTRODUCTION
By Wilson (1969) , Ross (1973) , Mirrlees(1974) , Holmstrom (1979) , rossmann and hart (1983) create a entrust the agency theory and application of the model analysis, the main solution to entrust an agency relationship exists in the problem of asymmetric information. Information asymmetry is a common phenomenon that exists in economic and social backgrand, for example, the downstream retailers closer to consumers than the upstream suppliers, and retailers have mastered more or more accurate market information. Gan, Sethi & Yan (2000) study the importance of supply chain coordination, and put forward by designing a menu of contracts to achieve coordination under the condition of asymmetric information to . Corbett & x. De Groote (2000) studied under the condition of asymmetric information, the supplier how to design the optimal discount strategy problem. Corbett & d. Zhou & c.s. Tang (2004) studied under the condition of asymmetric information, the supplier is how to obtain more reliable buyers through the consumption of information, thus providing more.But those papers did not consider the role of bargaining power in this situation.
We model the problem as a decision process of rational expectations in two-way game and solve it using game theory.
II. MODEL ANALYSIS
Consider two agent i and j for a deal, they each have some private information, the transaction price w is not specified directly, and completed by both bidding. The pricing rule is: an dominated agent i give transaction price This is a strategy of incomplete information static game we according to harsanyi transformation method, can the introduction of "natural" to decide business valuation type on both sides, including "natural" gives out the type of agent i, and only tell hiself; "Nature" also give agent j type, and only to inform agent j in the same way . both parties don't know The types of each others. Agent I and j make bid strategy, depending on their valuation the types of both parties. In the static strategy game, finding out their types of dependencies, and bid strategy The decision-making models of the agent i and j as follow : 
（3）
Calculation of probability and mathematical expectation: 
（5）
Bring formula (4) and (5) into (2): 
By the first-order conditions could get:
Comprising the coefficient of (6) and (3) , we have ( )
Put (7) into (1) and we can get the resulting coefficients as follows:
III. COMPARATIVE STATIC ANALYSIS
From the analysis from the section two, we can get some important conclusions as follows:
Theorem 1: the dominant agent i will always be an overreaction in the transaction.
Theorem 2:
, agent j will do the excessive reaction in the transaction;
, agent j will be cautious response in the transaction.
By observing the type (6) and sensitive coefficient of types of both parties, theorem 1 and theorem 2 above, can be easily derived.
Theorem 3:
(1) If 2 3 0 k > > , the resulting transaction price will be more sensitive to the type of the dominant agent i;
, the resulting transaction price will be more sensitive to the type of the dominant agent i; (3) Whatever the value of k，the resulting transaction price will always be cautious to the type of the agent j.
Proof: By observing the type (8) and sensitive coefficient of types of both parties relative to the resulting transaction price, sensitive coefficient with the type of the dominant agent i is ( )( ) So we can prove the first two sub-conclusions in Theorem 3. Sensitive coefficient with the type of the agent j is ( )
It is easy to get this sensitive coefficient will always be less than 1.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
This paper discuss that common dilemma exists in economic transactions, when both parties who make deal and get benefits from the deal, but f the transaction fails, his utility is nothing under private information.This problem can be solved by theory of incomplete information static game. In game model, the dominant agent of bargaining power play very important roles, we fortunately get some significant results as follow:
• Avoid the failing of transaction, the dominant agent i will always be an overreaction in the transaction.
• Agent j will do the excessive reaction in the transaction; If 1 3 k > , and vice versa.
• the resulting transaction price will be more sensitive to the type of the dominant agent i, if 2 3 0 k > > , the resulting transaction price will be more sensitive to the type of the dominant agent i, if 1 2 3 k > > .
• Whatever the value of k, the resulting transaction price will always be cautious to the type of the agent j.
Using the method of game theory, this paper studied the trade both parties for their own trading valuation in the presence of private information, how to use a double auction strategy to determine the value of the transaction.
